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Abstract 
 
How do economic policies and institutions affect job reallocation processes and their  
consequences for productivity growth?  This paper studies the extreme case of economic 
system change and alternative transitional policies in the former Soviet Republics of 
Russia and Ukraine.  Exploiting annual manufacturing census data from 1985 to 2000, 
we find that Soviet Russia displayed job flow behavior quite different from market 
economies, with very low rates of job reallocation that bore little relationship to relative 
productivity across firms and sectors.  Since liberalization began, the pace, heterogeneity, 
and productivity effects of job flows have increased substantially.  The increases 
occurred more quickly in rapidly reforming Russia than in “gradualist” Ukraine, as did 
the estimated effects of privatization and competitive pressures from product and labor 
markets on excess job reallocation and on the productivity-enhancing effects of job 
flows. 
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1.  Introduction 
  Although measurement of the magnitudes and covariates of job flows across 
employers has recently been the subject of considerable research, most attention has been 
devoted to studying the U.S. and other developed market economies with rather similar 
institutional structures.  The findings in these studies tend to be broadly consistent across 
countries, with similar measured rates of job creation and destruction, similar cyclical 
dynamics, and similar associations with employer characteristics.
1  Studies of the impact 
of job reallocation on aggregate productivity growth have mostly been carried out in the 
U.S., and they tend to find a positive relationship, although the results depend somewhat 
on data and measurement methods.
2 
How do job reallocation patterns and their consequences for productivity growth 
vary with the economic policy and institutional environment?  Economists' understanding 
of these issues has been constrained both by the limited variation in policies and 
institutions and by the difficult data requirements for such research.  This paper 
contributes to our understanding by exploiting a remarkable context:  the transition from 
central planning in the former Soviet Union.  Building upon measurement methods 
introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992, 1999) and drawing on annual 
manufacturing census data from 1985 to 2000, we describe a standard set of empirical 
regularities for Soviet Russia and for transitional Russia and Ukraine:  the magnitude of 
job reallocation across employers, the persistence and heterogeneity of firm-level 
employment changes, the variation of job flows with the aggregate cycle, and the 
relationship of excess job reallocation with employer characteristics such as size, average 
wage, and capital intensity.  A particular innovation is an estimation of the effects of 
privatization and liberalization policies, working through competitive pressures from both 
product and labor markets, on the propensity for firms to reallocate jobs.  Our analysis of 
                                                 
1 Nearly all of the research has focused on the manufacturing sector.  See Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 
1992), Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989a, 1989b), and 
Leonard (1987) on the U.S., Albaek and Sorensen (1998) on Denmark, and Baldwin, Dunne, and 
Haltiwanger (1998) on Canada.  Roberts (1996) studies job flows in Chile, Columbia, and Morocco, 
finding somewhat higher flow rates and different cyclical fluctuations than in most of the literature, which 
is surveyed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). 
2 The contributions of job reallocation to productivity growth have been documented by Baily, Bartelsman, 
and Haltiwanger (2001), Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), 
Griliches and Regev (1995), and Olley and Pakes (1996), among others.  Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 
(2001) discuss the methodological issues. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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the productivity consequences of job flows extends methods proposed by Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), studying the effects from reallocation both within and 
between industries and during both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, and again 
emphasizing the roles of private ownership and market competition in fostering 
productivity-enhancing job reallocation. 
Our motivation for examining job flow patterns in the Soviet Union is the very 
different system of employment determination, in which most economic decisions were 
either planned or tightly regulated by government authorities.  The central planning 
system has been very little examined in this context, probably due to the unavailability of 
data.  The Soviet period also represents the common starting point for  economic 
transitions in Russia and Ukraine, the two largest countries in the East European and 
former Soviet region and two for which comparable firm-level data are available.  Our 
particular interest in a comparative analysis of job reallocation in these two countries lies 
in their quite different reform policies, with Ukraine by all accounts following a more 
“gradualist” path of slower liberalization, privatization, and stabilization than its larger 
neighbor for most of the period since the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union split up.  
More recently, in the late 1990s, Ukraine appears to have been catching up, at least 
according to the aggregate statistics and international financial institution evaluations.  
Our analysis therefore distinguishes a period of “early reforms” (1992-1996), when the 
most radical changes were introduced and Russia was the clear leader, from the “late 
reform” period (1996-2000), which was a period of less dramatic reforms in Russia while 
Ukraine recouped most of its lag in policy implementation. 
The relevant characteristics of the Soviet economic system and of the two 
countries’ reform policies are discussed further in Section 2 below, but already this brief 
characterization suggests the following important questions:  Does a planned economy 
exhibit less job reallocation and a weaker relationship between job reallocation and 
productivity growth?  Is a more gradualist policy in the transition from central planning 
reflected in a slower or faster pace of job reallocation and a better or worse functioning of 
the labor market, in the sense of the correlation of job flows with productivity?  Relative 
to the socialist period, are the patterns of job flows – their magnitudes and relationships William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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with firm characteristics – becoming more similar to those observed in the West (as 
summarized, for instance, by Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999)?  How do such policy-
relevant variables as firm ownership and the extent of competition in product and labor 
markets influence the degree to which job reallocation is productivity-enhancing, and 
how do these patterns compare for Ukraine and Russia?  These are the main questions 
around which we organize our analysis. 
Our database is quite appropriate for addressing these questions, as it covers the 
universe of large and medium-sized industrial firms in each country at the beginning of 
transition, accounting in 1992 for 90.5 percent of officially reported industrial 
employment in Russia and 94.1 percent in Ukraine.  Not only the scope, but also the 
variable definitions are essentially identical across the two countries, as we have 
constructed the database from original data provided by the Russian and Ukrainian State 
Statistical Committees, which were branches of the same organization during the Soviet 
period and which still employ the same reporting methods as they did formerly.  The 
data, which are further described in an Appendix, contain identical measures for 
employment, output, and industrial classification, and they permit us to construct 
comparable measures of private ownership and product market and local labor market 
structure.
3  They also have the advantage of long time series:  annual observations from 
1985 to 2000 for Russian firms and from 1992 to 2000 for those in Ukraine.  The earlier 
Russian data permit us to trace out longer-term changes from the pre-perestroika Soviet 
period into the transition; given that Ukraine was governed by the same economic and 
political regime as Russia, the 1985-91 behavior for Ukraine is unlikely to differ 
substantially from Russia’s, although the earlier Ukrainian data are unfortunately 
unavailable for study. 
An important limitation of the data available to us is that they contain information 
only on industrial firms, and for comparability with other studies we further restrict 
                                                 
3 Cross-country studies of job reallocation behavior are typically fraught by inconsistent definitions and 
measurement methods; see, e.g., the discussion of typical comparability problems and of the harmonization 
of U.S. and Canadian data in Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998).  Our data have the unusual 
advantages not only of fully consistent coverage and definitions across countries, but also a common 
starting point that facilitates an analysis of the changes in behavior following the adoption of different 
policy reform programs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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attention to firms in the manufacturing sector.  Another constraint is that the data permit 
no inferences to be drawn concerning exit and entry patterns or new small firms, which 
are likely to be important sources of job creation.
4  These restrictions imply that our focus 
in this paper is the set of “old” manufacturing firms operating during and inherited from 
the Soviet period.  Even so delimited, the large size of this sector, its importance to the 
Russian and Ukrainian economies during the Soviet period, and the particular difficulties 
it faces in restructuring suggest that it is a worthwhile subject for study.  With respect to 
these firms, the data provide a nearly ideal setting for examining the effects of economic 
institutions and policies on job reallocation patterns and their consequences for 
productivity growth. 
Our work builds not only on previous work for the U.S. and other developed 
market economies but also on previous studies of job flows in the transition.
5  While 
providing valuable information on some of the job flow patterns in several countries, the 
studies contain relatively little information on either the pre-transition period or the 
relationship of job flows with productivity.
6  Our study is also related to research on 
developing economies, although most of the latter are much less industrialized than 
Russia and Ukraine, and the research contains few examples of studies similar to our own 
of abrupt policy changes whose impact can be analyzed using pre- and post-change data.
7  
In the latter vein, a related work is Olley and Pakes’ (1996) analysis of the effects of 
                                                 
4 Small firms owned by individuals are systematically excluded from these databases, as described in the 
Data Appendix together with more details about the data sources and construction.  Our inability to track 
entry and exit reliably implies that the analysis is restricted to continuing firms, a restriction which is 
common to all the studies of job flows using firm-level data in East European economies. 
5 Studies of job flows using census-type data in Eastern Europe include Acquisti and Lehmann (2000), 
Brown and Earle (2002a), Faggio and Konings (1999), and Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996); these 
data typically include most medium and large manufacturing firms.  Studies using sample surveys of firms 
include Bilsen and Konings (1998), Brown and Earle (2002b), and Kapeliushnikov (1997).  Haltiwanger 
and Vodopivec (2002) and Jurajda and Terrell (2000) use information from individual work histories, 
including reasons for job separations, to estimate job flows. 
6 Only Konings, Lehmann, and Schaffer (1996) have pre-1989 information in their data, which include 
1988-1991 time series on manufacturing firms in Poland, where gradual liberalization started much earlier 
than in the Soviet Union, however, and “big bang” liberalization occurred already in January 1990.   
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) analyze retrospective data in Estonia from 1989 to early 1995, while 
Jurajda and Terrell (2000) do the same for the Czech Republic from 1991 to 1996.  None of these papers 
study the relationship between job reallocation and productivity growth. 
7 An exception is studies of the effects of import liberalization on productivity growth – not on job 
reallocation per se – in Mexico (Tybout and Westerbrook, 1995) and Chile (Pavcnik, 2002). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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deregulation on productivity growth in the U.S. telecommunications equipment sector, 
the methods from which we draw upon in our productivity analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  To provide further motivation for 
our comparative analysis of job flows in the Soviet Union and in transitional Russia and 
Ukraine, Section 2 provides a brief discussion of employment determination under 
central planning, of the different economic reform programs adopted in the two successor 
countries, and of the aggregate behavior of output and employment during the reform 
period.  Section 3 then presents our calculations of the magnitudes, persistence, and 
heterogeneity of manufacturing job flows in these countries.  Section 4 describes the 
relationships of employment volatility with employer characteristics, including not only 
such standard variables in the literature as size, capital intensity, and average wage, but 
also private versus state ownership and the structures of the firm’s product and local labor 
markets.  We use simulation methods to compute the partial coefficients measuring the 
effects of these variables on predicted excess job reallocation. 
The relationship of job flows with productivity differentials across firms and 
industries is the subject of Sections 5 and 6.  Our decomposition techniques extend 
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan’s (2001) method to measure the contribution of job 
flows to sectoral and aggregate productivity growth and to estimate the impact of firm 
characteristics on the relationship of employment share growth and firm-level 
productivity differentials.  The particular focus of Section 6 is an assessment of evidence 
for the hypothesis that privatization and liberalization policies have increased the extent 
to which job flows are productivity-enhancing.  Section 7 summarizes the results, while 
the data sources and methods are described in an Appendix.  Throughout the analysis, we 
assess whether the job flow patterns among the manufacturing firms in our data have 
changed from the Soviet to the post-Soviet period and from the first half of the reform 
period (1992-1996) to the second half (1996-2000) – that is, whether they are moving in 
the direction of patterns characteristic of market economies and whether they have 
become increasingly productivity-enhancing – and we conduct tests for differences in 
behavior across the two countries. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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2.  Soviet Planning, Post-Soviet Reforms, and Implications for Job 
Reallocation  
How would one expect job flow patterns to look during the Soviet period?  Under 
central planning, most variables that we think of as business decisions – output, product 
variety, prices, technology, wages, and investment levels – were either specifically 
planned or indirectly controlled.
8  Enterprises had strong incentives to meet planned 
output targets, but little incentive to contain costs, to innovate, or to produce goods of 
value.  There was no effective competition, no business ownership, no entry, and only 
regulated imports.  Thus, the usual factors that might be supposed to influence 
employment decisions were largely absent. 
Furthermore, worker mobility was restricted by a number of practices, and 
enterprises had rather little discretion in their decisions on employment.
9  Sometimes 
employment levels were fixed explicitly, but the central planners’ usual method of 
constraining employment, particularly in the later Soviet period, was to set a maximum 
fund available for an enterprise’s total wage bill while specifying wage rates according to 
just a few criteria, such as occupation and industry.  There were also constraints on the 
ability of firms to fire workers, although layoffs were not completely unknown.   
Arguably, however, the constraints on employment were due more to the planners’ fear 
of excessive hiring than of firing, or of unemployment, as a number of factors – including 
soft budget constraints, planned output targets, and unreliable input supplies – combined 
to produce continual excess demand for labor (Kornai, 1992). 
How well did the socialist planners do in allocating labor across alternative uses?  
Frequently the objectives of the plan included political objectives, among them the 
prestige of rapid industrialization and of large, impressive projects, but the planners were 
also concerned with output and thus with productive efficiency.  Besides having to 
overcome the political objectives and the whims of the Communist Party leaders, 
however, a major problem in implementing the efficiency objective was lack of 
                                                 
8 For a comprehensive overview of the socialist system, see Kornai (1992). 
9 For a discussion of labor allocation in the Soviet Union, see Granick (1987).  Gregory and Collier (1988) 
discuss Soviet unemployment, which appears to have been very low (although non-zero). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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information, itself due to inherent features of the system:  fixed prices and wages, and 
perverse incentives to innovate and to reveal information on productive capacities. 
This discussion implies that the incentives and frictions of the socialist system 
might create very different patterns of job flows compared to those that have been 
documented in developed market economies.  Job flows are likely to be smaller, less 
heterogeneous, and less closely associated with variables representing adjustment costs.  
The lack of information might have prevented central planners from reallocating 
employment from lower productivity to higher productivity enterprises, although how 
well they actually performed is an empirical question – a very interesting one that we can 
address with our data. 
Turning to the transitional period, the factors affecting job flows would seem to 
be quite different from those in the Soviet Union.  The abolition of constraints on 
employment leaves firms free to choose their own employment levels in principle, as 
liberalization more broadly permits enterprises, even those remaining in state ownership, 
to make most decisions autonomously.  The extent to which firms actually adjust 
employment in response to changes in their environment, however, is likely to be a 
function of such factors as the strength of competitive pressures, the objectives of the 
state or new owners, the effectiveness of corporate governance by the owners, and the 
information conveyed by prices and wages.  These factors in turn are influenced by the 
specific design of policies of liberalization, privatization, and stabilization that were 
adopted to initiate the transition to a market economy (e.g., Lipton and Sachs, 1990; 
Blanchard et al., 1991), as well as a variety of other policies (for instance, concerning 
layoffs and unemployment) and institutional development. 
The pace and design of such policy reforms after the break-up of the Soviet Union 
differed substantially between Russia and Ukraine, the two largest Soviet successor 
states.  Although the policy changes in both were rapid and radical by the standards of 
most countries, Ukraine by all accounts initially followed a more “gradualist” path than 
its larger neighbor in the early and mid-1990s, while by the end of the decade there 
appears to have been substantial convergence in policies.  Concerning the earlier period, 
for instance, the World Bank (1996) provided rankings of transitional economies William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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according to the “extent of economic liberalization,” placing Russia almost at the top 
(just behind Kyrgyzstan) of the CIS countries, in front of Bulgaria, and well ahead of 
China and Vietnam.  Ukraine’s rank was considerably lower, placing it in the “least 
advanced” group of reformers together with Belarus and most of the Central Asian 
Republics. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provides other 
ratings of “progress in transition” along several different dimensions, and in a time series 
from 1992 to 2001.  The scale for each dimensions is from 1 (denoting “unreformed”) to 
4.3 (denoting a “market economy standard”).  The 1992 scores given for both price 
liberalization and foreign exchange and trade liberalization were 3.0 for Russia and 1.0 
for Ukraine.  Only in 1995 did Ukraine’s score rise to 3.0 (EBRD, 1998), converging 
with Russia’s.
10 
Concerning privatization, both countries used some form of voucher privatization 
method with substantial preferences for employees, but Russia’s pace was much faster.  
Most Russian industrial enterprises had been majority privatized firms by July 1994, 
while Ukraine proceeded much more gradually.  Moreover, insider buyouts and 
collective worker ownership were still more important in Ukraine than in Russia.
11  
Already in 1992, the EBRD (2001) awarded Russia a score of 2.0 for large privatization, 
while Ukraine received only 1.0.  Russia’s score reached 3.0 in 1993 and 3.3 in 1997 (the 
same as Poland, and ahead of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania), while Ukraine’s 
reached only 2.3 (behind Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, F.Y.R. Macedonia, Moldova, and 
Uzbekistan).  The Ukrainian privatization score then remained at this level until 2000, at 
which time it rose to 2.7, just behind Russia’s. 
The EBRD (1998) also estimated that the private sector in 1993 already accounted 
for 40 percent of Russian GDP but only 15 percent of Ukraine’s.  In 1998, the figures 
were 70 percent in Russia, towards the top end of all transitional economies, but only 55 
                                                 
10 The EBRD does not provide ratings for labor market liberalization, but anecdotal evidence indicates that 
this process has also been somewhat uneven in the successor states, in particular as local governments have 
frequently attempted to interfere with mass layoffs and with inward migration through systems of permits 
(propiski).  See Gimpelson and Lippoldt (2001) and Kapeliushnikov (2001) for detailed discussions of 
Russian labor market behavior and policies. 
11 See IMF (1999) or Pivovarsky (2001) for discussions of privatization in Ukraine, and Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1993) or Earle and Estrin (1997) for Russia. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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percent in Ukraine, towards the bottom.  By 2000, the estimate for Ukraine reached 60 
percent, again showing convergence towards Russia. 
Concerning stabilization, while the reported price inflation in Russia reached high 
rates by any standards, it pales in comparison to Ukraine’s hyperinflation during most of 
this period:  cumulating the annual CPI inflation reported in EBRD (2001) for the years 
1992-2000 yields a total price increase of 9,442 percent in Russia and 108,664 percent in 
Ukraine.
12  By the late 1990s, however, official inflation rates were much more similar in 
the two countries (for instance, 14.8 percent in Russia and 15.9 percent in Ukraine in 
1997). 
Regardless of the exact figures, which are certainly subject to measurement errors 
and disputes, the clearly different pattern of policy choices in the two countries suggests 
an interesting set of comparative hypotheses.  If a quicker and more effective 
implementation of transitional policies tends to stimulate reallocation, then Ukraine’s 
gradualist policy is likely to be reflected in a slower move away from the Soviet patterns, 
and Russia’s job flows should increase more quickly than those of Ukraine.  Russia 
would also be more likely than Ukraine to display the cyclical behavior and strong 
correlations of job reallocation with variables such as firm size, average wage, and capital 
intensity that have been found in the West.  The effects of private ownership and of 
product and labor market competition are also likely to be stronger in more rapidly 
reforming Russia, due to the greater levels of inside ownership and less rapid 
liberalization in Ukraine.  Concerning the relationship between job flows and relative 
firm productivity, Russia may display a greater tendency for job reallocation to enhance 
productivity than Ukraine, while the effects of privatization and market competition on 
the extent to which job reallocation is productivity-enhancing should be greater in the 
former than the latter.
13 
                                                 
12 According to Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002), Ukraine’s experience meets the classic definition of 
hyperinflation from April 1991 to November 1994, the second longest period of hyperinflation in postwar 
history. 
13 An alternative possibility is that more cautious, gradual policies are more successful at stimulating 
productive reallocation, and that overly rushed transitional programs lead to unemployment rather than 
genuine reallocation, as in the literature on the optimal speed of transition (see, e.g., Aghion and Blanchard, 
1994; Boeri and Terrell, 2002), or in Caballero and Hammour’s (1996) discussion of “hyperkinesis.”  We 
discuss the possibility that job flows are unassociated or negatively associated with productivity growth 
below. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Because the Russian and Ukrainian policies had converged to a considerable 
extent by the late 1990s, however, the differences across countries may be attenuated or 
eliminated by the end of the period.  In order to examine how these differences varied 
over the transition, our analysis in this paper divides the total time period not only into a 
Soviet and a post-Soviet period, but also the latter into subperiods designated “early 
reform” (1992-1996) and “late reform” (1996-2000).  In general, this discussion suggests 
that the impact of reforms on the pace of job flows, their relationship with firm 
characteristics, and the extent to which they are productivity-enhancing should be large in 
Russia during early reforms, while Ukraine should exhibit similar patterns only during 
the late reform period. 
Finally, we present aggregate statistics on industrial production and employment 
as additional useful background and motivation for our analysis.  The aggregate data, 
shown in Figure 1, make clear that job destruction has far outweighed job creation in the 
industrial sectors of both countries during the transitional period.  Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of industrial employment in the two countries over 1992-2000, including a 
remarkable fall by 1999 of 39 percent in Ukraine and 35 percent in Russia, followed by a 
small increase in 2000.  Although large by any standard, the employment drop was 
nonetheless substantially exceeded by the fall in output of 52 percent in Ukraine and 39 
percent in Russia, resulting in an initially sharp decline in productivity followed by a 
gradual recovery.
14 
These aggregate patterns may be unsurprising to anyone familiar with recent 
developments in the East European region, but little is known about the character of the 
massive job destruction.  Does it represent a “cleansing recession” in the sense of 
Caballero and Hammour (1994), whereby the economy rids itself of its least efficient 
jobs?  Alternatively, does it represent a simple aggregate downturn, in which all firms 
downsize equally, or at least without regard to productivity, due to a common negative 
shock?  Finally, is it rather the case that the job destruction is concentrated among the 
better, more efficient firms in industry, suggesting “sclerosis” (Caballero and Hammour, 
                                                 
14 The magnitudes of the reported declines in real output should be treated with caution, as price changes 
may be overstated (due to quality improvements) and quantity changes may be understated (due to growth 
in the informal economy); Campos and Coricelli (2002) summarize some of these issues. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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1996, 2000), in which unproductive jobs survive due to market imperfections and 
government policies?  In both Ukraine and Russia, there may be compelling reasons to 
suspect some sclerotic forces at work, as the governments have frequently engaged in 
direct subsidization and other forms of support for weak and failing firms, while 
discriminatory taxes, bureaucratic interference, poor contract enforcement, and uncertain 
property rights protection have impeded those that are more successful (e.g., Frye and 
Shleifer, 1997; Aslund, Boone, and Johnson, 1996).  The view that the economic 
transition has destroyed the better, more productive parts of the industrial sector is far 
from uncommon in these countries, although it is usually associated with nostalgia for the 
Soviet period.  In this paper, we provide evidence on the character of the reform-induced 
resource reallocation through an analysis relating the job flows to firm-level productivity 
measures in these countries. 
The aggregate statistics in Figure 1 also imply the possibility to analyze the 
cyclical properties of the job flows.  While undergoing rapid institutional change these 
countries experienced a severe aggregate contraction and the beginnings of what appears 
to be an expansion phase.  By dividing the 1992-2000 period into two halves, we are able 
to provide some analysis of the job flow patterns over these countries’ first post-socialist 
business cycle.  An examination of the relationships between the firm-level patterns and 
the aggregate cyclical patterns provides another dimension for addressing our basic 
question on the degree to which job flow patterns in these two economies are converging 
towards those in developed market economies. 
3.  Job Flows in Russian and Ukrainian Manufacturing 
The job flow concepts in this paper follow the definitions of Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1990, 1992, 1999), but we use regression analysis to calculate the flow rates 
and the precision of the estimates.  Information on statistical precision is important in 
comparing the rates across countries and assessing the impact of potential determinants of 
job flows.  The dependent variables in the regressions are as follows:  job creation (JC), 
the net employment change for growing firms and zero otherwise; job destruction (JD), 
the absolute value of the net employment change for contracting firms and zero 
otherwise; net employment change (NC); and job reallocation (JR), the absolute value of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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NC.  We also calculate excess job reallocation (XJR) for any set of observations as twice 
the smaller of the size-weighted mean JC or JD for that set.  All of these job flows are 
converted into rates by dividing by average employment across the two years.  The 
observations in the flow regressions are weighted by each firm’s average share of 
employment in its country’s industrial registry in the corresponding pair of years. 
For comparability with others’ findings and in order to provide detailed 
information on the time pattern of changes in the job flows, we present estimated 
regressions for the pooled sample, 1992-2000, including year effects interacted with 
Russian and Ukrainian country dummies.  The results from these estimations are shown 
in the upper panel of Table 1.  Conventional t-tests of differences between Ukrainian and 
Russian flow rates are also indicated. 
A second approach facilitates a more compact examination of the impact of 
reforms and the extent of convergence to Western job flow patterns.  The regressions in 
the bottom panel of Table 1 show the results from including dummies for three distinct 
time periods:  1985-1992 (the Soviet period), 1992-1996 (the turbulent period of early 
reforms), and 1996-2000 (the late reform period, when the most radical changes had 
already been enacted).  The differences across countries are tested by interacting each of 
the latter two time period dummies with Russian and Ukrainian country dummies.  This 
specification permits the effects of firm characteristics to vary over a total of five 
country-periods:  Soviet Russia, Early Reform Russia, Early Reform Ukraine, Late 
Reform Russia, and Late Reform Ukraine.  
The results for net employment growth in these data mirror the aggregate industry 
time series in Figure 1, being negative every year from 1992 to 1999 in both countries, 
with the largest declines in the mid-1990s.  Only in the last period, 1999-2000, which saw 
the only substantial growth in industrial production since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, does net employment change become positive in Russia, while the magnitude of 
the decline in Ukraine falls substantially.
15 
                                                 
15 The official statistics on aggregate industrial employment (in Figure 1) imply employment growth in 
both countries from 1999 to 2000, but these include estimates of employment in new small firms and 
incorporate other “expert opinions” of the State Statistical Committees.  A further difference from the 
official aggregates on industry employment is that our calculations pertain only to the manufacturing William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Our computation of the job creation rate is negligible in Russian manufacturing 
during the Soviet period and in both countries it grows moderately through the 1990s in 
the firms inherited from the Soviet Union.  Only in 1999-2000  does JC pass six percent 
for the Russian firms, reaching the bottom end of the range of creation rates of the full 
manufacturing sectors in the U.S. and other market economies; in Ukraine it remains 
mired at a very low level.
16  Indeed, JC in the first years after reforms is rather similar in 
the two countries but becomes sharply higher in Russia for most of the period thereafter. 
The calculated job destruction is also very low in the Soviet period, but in the old 
firms of both Russian and Ukrainian manufacturing the rate rises rapidly in the early 
reform period, quickly reaching the typical range of rates found in the U.S.  From initially 
similar levels in 1992-1993, JD increases more quickly in Russia but then decreases in 
the late reform period, while Ukraine’s JD remains high. 
Following the creation and destruction trends, JR initially increases and then 
remains fairly constant.  In 1992-1993, the level of JR is not greatly different between the 
firms in the two countries, but in 1993-1994 it is already much higher in Russia, while in 
the later years it is higher in Ukraine.  Excess job reallocation (XJR) is also rather similar 
at the beginning of the 1990s and then rises steadily in both countries, but it becomes 
substantially higher in Russia.  Thus, the job flows from 1992 onwards show a general 
pattern of starting at comparable levels for the old manufacturing firms in the two 
countries, then diverging in the middle and late 1990s, and partially re-converging 
towards the end of the period. 
The cyclical relationships among the components of job flows have received 
considerable attention in the Western literature.  In a study of the U.S. and Canadian 
manufacturing sectors, for instance, Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) report a 
simple correlation between job creation and destruction of –0.291 in Canada and –0.676 in 
                                                                                                                                                 
sector; when we include the nonmanufacturing firms in the registry, the employment growth rates look very 
similar to the official aggregates, seldom differing by more than one percentage point. 
16 Note again that our results pertain to the old manufacturing sector, and that it is likely that if job creation 
by entering firms could be measured, then the Russian rate would be still higher than 6 percent.  As a 
benchmark, note that Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1999, p. 2721) summary of annual gross job creation rates 
range from 6.2 to 12.1 percent for the full manufacturing sectors of various market economies, but they 
also emphasize that all job flows are negatively related to firm age and size.  The figures in Davis, 
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 61), for instance, imply that all flows are more than 50 percent higher for 
firms with fewer than 100 employees than for those that are larger. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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the U.S.  Our calculation of this correlation for Soviet Russia actually shows a positive 
relationship (0.162), however.  The correlation becomes highly negative in our data for 
post-reform Russia (-0.891), and it is also negative in post-reform Ukraine (-0.338).  A 
second finding from Western studies is a higher volatility of job destruction than of job 
creation, and Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) report the ratio of the variance of 
destruction to creation as 1.5 in Canada and 2.1 in the U.S.  This relationship also holds 
in our data, but the relative volatility of destruction is much higher in Soviet Russia 
(13.7), falling after reforms to a level similar to that in North America (1.3), while 
Ukraine’s post-reform ratio is a bit higher (2.5). 
The data, therefore, do appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that job flows 
reflect economic institutions and policies.  Soviet Russia exhibits very low job flow rates, 
consistent with both the constraints placed on employment by central planners and the 
lack of incentives for employment adjustments.  The relationships among some of the 
flows are quite different from those found in developed market economies.  After reforms 
begin, both the magnitudes of the flows in our data and the relationships among them 
converge toward Western patterns.
17  The data also show substantial differences between 
behavior of firms in Russia and Ukraine.  Starting from a similar position in 1992, firms 
in more rapidly reforming Russia begin to exhibit much greater levels of job reallocation 
than in more slowly reforming Ukraine during the early transitional period.  Furthermore, 
job creation grows much more quickly in Russia, and the magnitude of net employment 
decline is smaller.  These findings suggest that Russia's policy came closer to producing 
an “optimal speed of transition,” and, at least for the old manufacturing sectors of these 
two countries, the data suggest that more aggressive reforms, rather than a gradualist 
strategy, are more likely to enhance restructuring. 
Do these flows persist, suggesting that longer term employment restructuring is at 
work, or do they reflect temporary deviations of employment that tend to be reversed 
subsequently?  Table 2 documents the persistence rates of the job flows, i.e., the extent to 
which jobs added or subtracted from the firm remain gained or lost in future years.   
                                                 
17 The increased flows are consistent with the findings for some other East European economies:  Konings, 
Lehmann, and Schaffer (1996) for Poland from 1988 to 1991, Jurajda and Terrell (2000) for the Czech 
Republic from 1991 to 1996, and Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) for Estonia from 1989 to 1995. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
  15
Persistence rates are calculated for one-year and two-year periods, and both have fallen 
slightly during the reform period by comparison with Soviet socialism.  Apparently, the 
planners had little tendency to reverse their decisions on changing employment levels!  
As in other countries, the persistence rate is lower for JC than for JD, but for the latter it 
is quite high by international standards.  Thus, while creation persistence falls 
substantially during the transition, the measured flows do not appear to be the result of 
highly volatile behavior or noise in the data:  they are not primarily temporary 
phenomena, and they are even less so under central planning than in the transition. 
A final question in our description of the job flows in our data concerns the 
heterogeneity of job flow behavior, which Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and others have 
emphasized in their research on the U.S. economy.  A first step in our analysis of these 
issues in the Soviet transition is an examination of the distribution of firm-level 
employment growth rates, shown in Table 3.  In the periods under consideration, the rates 
become progressively more heterogeneous in both countries.  Though employment 
declined in over half the firms, an increasing proportion actually enjoyed employment 
gains.  In the early reform period, the Russian employment growth distribution displays 
much higher heterogeneity than does the Ukrainian, while the latter widens significantly 
only in the later reform period, partially converging with Russian behavior. 
It is useful to compare the level of employment growth heterogeneity in our data 
with Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) findings for the U.S. manufacturing sector.  They 
report that 29 percent of continuing establishments experience a percentage growth rate 
in the interval of (-5,+5) and 53 percent lie in the interval (-15,+15).
18  Our analogous 
calculations around median employment growth in our data reveal a much less 
heterogeneous distribution in Soviet Russia, where 58 percent of firm growth rates lie in 
the (-5,+5) interval and 87 percent in the (-15,+15) interval.
19  The distribution widened 
dramatically with reforms, as these intervals account for only 28 and 62 percent of the 
                                                 
18 The figures actually reported by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) include establishment births and deaths, 
accounting for 14 percent of their annual growth rate observations.  Because our data pertain to continuing 
firms, we have rescaled their figures, dividing by 0.86. 
19 Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) report their figures for ranges of the distribution centered around zero, 
which appears to be the median growth rate in their data; we therefore center the ranges for our calculations 
around the medians in our data, but the qualitative conclusions would be unaffected by centering around 
zero. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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distribution in early reform Russia and 34 and 73 percent in early reform Ukraine, 
respectively.  Again the data imply that behavior in the old manufacturing firms of both 
countries moved substantially in the direction of a market economy, but Ukraine’s 
progressed at a slower rate than Russia’s did through most of the 1990s.
20 
Some of the variation in employment growth is associated with differences in 
behavior across industries, which are grouped into broad manufacturing sectors in Table 
4.  Average JC is actually higher than JD in the fuel sector, while machine building’s JD 
is much larger than its JC by a factor of 12 in Ukraine and 7.6 in Russia.  The patterns of 
differences across sectors are very similar in the two countries:  the Pearson correlation 
coefficients are 0.831 for JC and 0.889 for JD.  These are very similar to Baldwin, 
Dunne, and Haltiwanger’s (1998) analogous estimates for U.S. and Canadian two-digit 
manufacturing industries:  0.854 for JC and 0.835 for JD.
21 
The extent to which industry differences account for the heterogeneity can be 
examined using Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) decomposition of XJR into its intra- and 
inter-industry components.  For this purpose, Table 5 uses 5-digit industries, of which 
there are usually 260 in a given year of our data.  Similar to the results for the U.S., the 
results imply that most XJR occurs within rather than between five-digit industries.  In 
some years, however, inter-industry XJR is quite high, particularly in 1995-1996 and 
1999-2000.  The average levels for the early reform period of 1992-1996 are greater than 
any of the estimates for comparable sets of industries in the country studies reported in 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1999, Table 5).  This finding suggests that inter-industry flows 
may be relatively large in the reallocation process of the early transition, although the 
intra-industry flows still dominate.   
4.  Job Flows and Employer Characteristics 
The previous section provided evidence that job flows in Russian and Ukrainian 
manufacturing during the transitional period changed significantly relative to their Soviet 
                                                 
20 And again we should note that our calculations pertain to a set of firms that is larger and older than the 
universe, and the heterogeneity of growth rates would most likely be even higher if we were able to include 
small start-ups in our calculations. 
21 The estimates in Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) are based on slightly more disaggregated 
industries than those shown in our Table 4, but their precise level of aggregation is difficult to replicate in 
our data because of a different system of industrial classification. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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origins, becoming much larger and substantially more heterogeneous across firms.  Is this 
heterogeneity associated with firm characteristics?  Relevant characteristics investigated 
by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) 
include size, average wage, and capital intensity, variables that are usually motivated as 
proxies for adjustment costs in employment. 
To these characteristics, our analysis in this section adds firm ownership (state 
versus private) and dispersion in the product market and local labor market in which the 
firm operates.  Firm ownership is a particularly interesting factor in the transitional 
setting as its effects reflect privatization policies, working through changes in corporate 
governance and management to increase enterprise restructuring.  The privatization 
policies were rather different in the two countries, as the Ukrainian process took place 
more gradually and gave even less scope for ownership by non-employee outside 
investors than it did in Russia.  If employee-owners are less likely to reallocate jobs, then 
we might expect a smaller impact of private ownership in Ukraine than in Russia.
22 
Our analysis of local labor market dispersion is motivated by the fact that both 
countries are quite large and have many localities that may be characterized as “one-
company towns.”  In such locations, firms may face a steeply rising labor supply 
function, as workers’ restricted outside options make them more willing to accept wage 
cuts to maintain employment, while hiring additional employees requires inducing non-
participants to enter the labor force or drawing workers to move or commute from other 
regions.  The variation in local employment dispersion offered by our data provides an 
interesting possibility for testing such monopsony effects.   
Concerning liberalization policies, which pertain to prices, wages, business entry, 
imports and restrictions on mobility and commerce, Ukraine appears to have proceeded 
more slowly than Russia, at least according to the World Bank (1996) and the EBRD 
(1998, 2001), as discussed in Section 2 above.  Thus, we may expect that the competitive 
pressure inherent in a given market structure is stronger in Russia than Ukraine. 
                                                 
22 Measuring private ownership is not without ambiguities in this setting, where for instance partially state-
owned entities hold shares in other partially privatized entities.  Our data, however, provide us only with 
information on direct shareholding, which we use to measure majority private ownership. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Table 6 provides summary statistics for the main characteristics used in the 
analysis.  In Russia, information on ownership is available for each firm-year only in the 
form of a dummy variable for majority private ownership, Private; thus we define a 
similar dummy for Ukraine based on information concerning share ownership.  During 
the Soviet period, the mean of this variable is of course zero, but consistent with the 
evaluations of the international financial institutions, discussed in Section 2, above, a 
much larger fraction of Russian enterprises was already majority private in the early 
reform period:  48.9 percent of firm-year observations, compared with 11.7 percent in 
Ukraine.  By the late reform period, the private share had risen dramatically in both 
countries:  81.4 percent in Russia and 46.8 percent in Ukraine.  Private is included in the 
regression as the value for year t-1 to explain flows from year t-1 to year t. 
To control for pre-privatization behavior in the regressions, we also define a 
dummy variable Ever Private as equal to one if the firm is majority private by 2000, or 
by the last year it appears in the database.  The mean of this variable is also shown in 
Table 6, the slight variation over time merely reflecting the small changes in the sample 
across the different periods.  Including Ever Private in the regressions implies that the 
Private effect is estimated by regression-adjusted difference-in-differences.
23 
The two dimensions of competitive pressure, domestic product market and local 
labor market, are measured as dispersion indices.  Our measure of domestic product 
market dispersion follows Brown and Earle’s (2002a) method of using data at both the 
national and regional levels to account for different geographic market sizes across 
industries.  The premise of the method is that the geographic scope of the market in an 
industry is reflected in the degree to which producers in the industry are located across 
different regions of the country.  For instance, an industry with member firms in all 
regions is likely to have regional markets, and an industry with firms in only a few 
regions is likely to be a national market.  To implement a mixed dispersion measure, we 
first calculate the opposite of the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
for each industry at the regional and national levels.  These regional and national 
dispersion measures are then combined into a single index, Product Market Dispersion, 
                                                 
23 The ownership status of firms in these data does not shift back from private to state ownership. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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by taking their weighted sum where the weight on the regional dispersion measure is the 
proportion of regions with at least one firm in industry j in year t and the weight on the 
national dispersion measure is one minus this proportion.  To measure local Labor 
Market Dispersion, we similarly calculate the opposite of the natural logarithm of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for local industrial employment concentration in each 
municipality in Russia and county (raion) in Ukraine.  Table 6 provides the means and 
standard deviations of these measures, showing a steady decline in Product Market 
Dispersion in both countries, and somewhat lower dispersion in Ukraine than in Russia.  
The Labor Market Dispersion measures are similar in both countries and show no distinct 
trends over time.  Both the product and labor market dispersion indices from year t-1 are 
included in the regressions to explain flows between years t-1 and t.  
Table 6 also includes descriptive statistics for the size variable, average 
employment over years t and t-1, which is higher at the mean in Russia than in Ukraine.  
Together with capital intensity and the average wage, size is examined because of its 
possible association with fixed costs of labor adjustment, for instance due to higher hiring 
costs or more firm-specific human capital.
24  A second effect of the firm’s average wage 
could arise due to the turbulent nature of industrial change in which expanding firms may 
need to offer substantial wage premia to attract additional workers.  Our construction of 
both the capital intensity and average wage variables follows Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1999) in constructing a ranking of all firms in a given country-year and scaling the 
ranking from 0 to 1.
25  So constructed, the capital intensity and average wage effects 
suffer less from problems associated with deflating the monetary values and with 
comparing these measures across Russia and Ukraine; they are measured in year t-1 to 
explain flows between years t-1 and t. 
The regressions also include five-digit industry fixed-effects to control for any 
time-invariant heterogeneity across industries in flow rates that might be correlated with 
the variables of interest.  The impact of reforms and the extent of convergence to Western 
job flow patterns are again assessed by including five period-country effects: Soviet 
                                                 
24 Oi’s (1962) analysis of labor as a quasi-fixed factor used the average wage of a group of workers as a 
proxy for the costs of hiring and training. 
25 The details of the data construction are given in the appendix.  Because the regressions use scaled 
variables, we do not present their summary statistics. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Russia, Early Reform Russia, Early Reform Ukraine, Late Reform Russia, and Late 
Reform Ukraine.  In these regressions, the period-country dummies are interacted with 
the employer characteristics to permit the estimated effects of the latter to vary.  
We calculate XJR coefficients for each firm characteristic separately by 
computing simulations of the impact of a one standard deviation change around the mean 
in each continuous firm characteristic on the predicted XJR, and a change from zero to 
one in the case of a firm characteristic that is a dummy.  Variables representing all other 
firm characteristics are assigned their true values.
26  Two natural exceptions to this 
procedure result from the logical connection of the variables Private and Ever Private:  
we set Private = 0 when calculating the effect of Ever Private, so that Ever Private 
captures the preprivatization effect; and we condition the effect of Private on Ever 
Private = 1, so that the coefficient for Private represents the effect of privatization on 
firms that are actually privatized. 
To explain our method more formally, taking the example of Private, we first 
predict JR conditional on private ownership for each firm i from the fitted equation 
(estimated by ordinary least squares – OLS):  
  γ α ˆ ˆ ˆ| i p p i Z r + = , (1) 
where  p i r| ˆ   is predicted reallocation conditional on private ownership,  p α ˆ is the OLS 
estimate of the private effect, Zi is a matrix of firm i’s true values for the other firm 
characteristics (with Ever Private = 1), and γˆ is the associated vector of coefficient 
estimates.
27  The subscript |p  indicates that the calculation is conditioned on private 
ownership.  Predicted NC conditional on private ownership is 
  ϕ β ˆ ˆ ˆ | i p p i Z g + = , (2) 
where  p β ˆ is the estimated private effect and ϕ ˆ  is again the vector of coefficient estimates 
associated with the variables in Zi.  Predicted XJR for each firm conditional on private 
ownership,  p i x | ˆ , can then be obtained from 
  ( ) p i p i p i g abs r x | | | ˆ ˆ ˆ − = , (3) 
where abs is the absolute value operator. 
                                                 
26 This procedure differs from that employed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), whose calculations are 
conditioned on the median values of all other variables. 
27 These calculations are performed for each year separately, but the year subscript is dropped in the text to 
reduce the complexity of the notation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Predicted XJR conditional on state ownership,  s i x | ˆ , is computed similarly: 
  ( ) ) ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ | | | ϕ γ i i s i s i s i Z abs Z g abs r x − = − = , (4) 
which differs from  p i x | ˆ in that  p α ˆ  and  p β ˆ , the private effects, drop out.  The XJR 
coefficient is then defined as the weighted average of the difference in predicted excess 
reallocation across all N firms in the sample: 
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where  i s  is the mean share of firm i in total employment.  
P
x
∆
∆ˆ  is our measure of the 
difference in XJR associated with private versus state ownership.  These simulations are 
conducted separately for each of the five country-periods. 
Table 7 displays the resulting estimates of the XJR coefficients.  Beginning with 
ownership, the results for the Ever Private dummy in Soviet Russia imply that firms that 
would be privatized later exhibit greater XJR during the Soviet period; the estimated 
coefficients for this variable vary across country-periods because the sample of not yet 
privatized firms is changing.  Of greater interest is the effect of Private while controlling 
for Ever Private.  In the early reform period, the estimated effect of private ownership on 
XJR is strongly positive in Russia, while it is initially slightly negative in Ukraine, but 
then becomes positive and similar in magnitude to Russia’s coefficient during the late 
reform period.  It thus appears that privatization has had a positive effect on job flow 
heterogeneity in both countries, but this came about more quickly in Russia. 
 Turning  to  Product Market Dispersion, the results indicate that a more dispersed 
structure was associated with slightly lower XJR in Soviet Russia.  The impact on XJR 
becomes strongly positive in Russia post-reform, while the effect in Ukraine is positive 
but much weaker.  These results are consistent with the more rapid progress in Russian 
liberalization policies, which permitted a stronger effect of competitive pressures than did 
the slower liberalization in Ukraine. 
The impact of Labor Market Dispersion on XJR is positive, except in late reform 
Ukraine.  Since the Russian XJR coefficient is positive already in the Soviet period and 
there is no clear trend upward during the transition, we cannot conclude that labor market 
liberalization has led to increased job flow volatility where potential competition exists.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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By these indicators, therefore, product market liberalization has tended to increase the 
volume of labor restructuring in Russia, while product and labor market liberalization 
appear to have rather little association with the restructuring level in Ukraine. 
  Capital intensity is negatively associated with XJR  in Soviet Russia, but the 
coefficient becomes positive and large in Early Reform Russia, while it remains negative 
in Ukraine.  The positive association appears to be inconsistent with the interpretation 
that capital intensity reflects adjustment costs.
28  The Russian XJR coefficient for wages 
is negative in the Soviet period, but both Russian and Ukrainian coefficients become 
strongly positive under reforms, also inconsistent with the adjustment cost interpretation.  
We suspect that the positive wage relationship in these countries reflects the abrupt 
demand shifts and large labor mobility costs:  firms creating jobs are forced to pay higher 
wages to attract workers. 
  On the other hand, XJR is increasingly negatively affected by size over time in 
both Russia and Ukraine, the results stronger for the former than the latter.  Thus, the 
results on the adjustment cost proxies give mixed evidence on whether firms are 
becoming more sensitive to adjustment costs – only the results for size are consistent with 
this interpretation.
29  
5.  Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth 
The discussion so far has documented the evolution of the magnitude, persistence, 
heterogeneity, and covariates of job flows among old manufacturing firms during the 
course of reforms in Russia and Ukraine.  How do these flows, particularly the increased 
pace of job destruction in this sector, relate to productivity?  Has the downsizing process 
been creative or cleansing, in the sense of contributing to productivity growth by 
eliminating less productive jobs?  Or would it be better characterized as neutral with 
respect to productivity, or even as destructive, resulting in the elimination of the more 
productive jobs in the Russian and Ukrainian economies?  Has the implied productivity 
                                                 
28 Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 50) report that XJR declines with capital intensity, but Davis 
and Haltiwanger (1999, p. 2747) report a positive association in simulations controlling for a host of other 
firm characteristics. 
29 There is some multicollinearity between capital intensity, wages, and size, but the qualitative results 
remain little changed when we include each of these variables separately, with the exception that the 
coefficient on capital intensity in late reform Russia becomes negative (–0.71). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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impact of job reallocation changed as reforms have been implemented?  Does the 
productivity relationship vary with ownership or market competition, and how do these 
patterns compare across Russia and Ukraine in transition and relative to Soviet Russia? 
We address these questions by building on a decomposition method proposed by 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001), and we also present a decomposition based on 
Olley and Pakes (1996).
30  Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) report the cross-
industry averages of the within-industry relationship of employment share growth and 
labor productivity in the U.S., and we extend this approach by adding an aggregation of 
the cross-industry relationships to total manufacturing sector productivity.  A possible 
difficulty with this extension is that measurement constraints, chiefly the availability of 
only gross output rather than value-added in the data and imperfect measures of relative 
price and quality changes, may create problems in interpreting the cross-industry job 
flows-productivity relationship.  We believe that the considerable interest in accounting 
for aggregate productivity dynamics outweighs these problems, but they should be borne 
in mind when interpreting the intersectoral results below.
31  A further extension in our 
work is to move beyond the simple decompositions to investigate the statistical 
significance of the relationships implied by the decomposition terms (for instance, the 
covariance of productivity level and employment share growth) and to estimate the 
association of these relationships with privatization and competition and how these may 
have changed in the post-reform period.  The methodology and results from this 
extension are discussed in the next section. 
The basic decomposition expresses aggregate productivity change, ∆Pt as follows: 
( ) 11 1 1 t it it it it t it eit eit
ii i e
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                  (6)  
                                                 
30 We also investigated a decomposition developed by Griliches and Regev (1995), which produces results 
that are very similar to those reported here and are available on request. 
31 Our data contain value-added only in Ukraine and only for 1994-1997.  As a check on our results, we the 
recomputed the decomposition with this measure, producing quite similar results to those we report using 
gross output.   For both countries and all years, we also investigated the results from using conventional 
producer price indices rather than output deflators; again the results differ little.  The potential problems 
notwithstanding, the practice of including intersectoral job flows in the decomposition is not 
unprecedented; Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001), for instance, decompose annual changes in 
aggregate manufacturing labor productivity into firm-level components associated with changes in 
productivity and in labor shares in total manufacturing employment. 
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where S is the weight (share) of a firm or industry, t indexes years, i indexes industries, 
and e indexes enterprises within industries, so that Pit is average productivity of sector i 
in year t and Peit is the productivity of enterprise e in sector i in year t.  The first term in 
this expression refers to the cross-industry weighted average of industry-average 
productivity gains; the weights are defined as the previous shares in order to fully 
distinguish average productivity growth from composition effects.  The second term 
measures the productivity consequences of intersectoral reallocation, compositional 
changes in industries weighted by previous year deviation of industry productivity from 
the aggregate mean.  The third captures the covariance between intersectoral reallocation 
and average sectoral productivity growth.  The fourth measures the covariance of 
intersectoral and intrasectoral reallocation, while the fifth term reflects the joint 
covariance of intersectoral changes, firm-level productivity growth, and intrasectoral 
composition.  The first term in (6) is the one studied by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 
(2001)), following whom it may be further decomposed as follows: 
( ) ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∆ ∆ + − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − − − − − −
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The firm term in (7) measures the average change in firm productivity holding 
composition constant at its previous year structure, the “within-firm” effect, which may 
be interpreted as a common technology shock for all firms.  The second term measures 
intrasectoral compositional changes, weighted by the previous year deviation of 
enterprise productivity from the industry mean.  The third term measures the intrasectoral 
covariance of productivity and compositional changes.  Each of these terms is computed 
for each industry and then the weighted sum is computed, where the weights are previous 
year industry employment shares. 
  Combining Equations (6) and (7) produces seven terms, the calculations of which 
are shown in Table 8 for each year and for Russia and Ukraine separately.  Productivity is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the output-employment ratio, and firms and 
industries are weighted by employment shares.
32  Starting with the first component, the 
                                                 
32 As described in the Data Appendix, our output measure is gross output, and our employment measure 
includes a full-time equivalent calculation for part-time workers, while it excludes “nonindustrial workers” 
who provide employee benefits.  In their analysis of labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing, Baily, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
  25
results suggest that within-firm productivity change is negligible in the Soviet period, but 
highly negative in the early 1990s in both Russia and Ukraine, reflecting a common 
negative productivity shock early in the transition; it then becomes positive in the late 
1990s as both economies recover.
33  The procyclicality of the within-firm effect implied 
by this pattern is also characteristic of the U.S. manufacturing sector, as has been 
demonstrated by Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001).  The Pearson correlation 
coefficient between annual manufacturing output growth and the within-firm effect is 
0.63 in their U.S. data, while we find the correlations between these variables to be -0.78  in 
Soviet Russia, 0.89 in transitional Russia, and 0.83 in Ukraine.  The cyclical behavior of 
this term therefore provides another example of a striking change of behavior:  from 
countercyclical in the Soviet period to procyclical during the transition, as in the U.S. 
Turning to the terms involving compositional change, or reallocation, the 
magnitude of all the covariance terms is negligible in both countries and all periods, as 
might be expected since they involve the products of small numbers.  The results for both 
the intrasectoral and intersectoral effects are practically zero in Soviet Russia, suggesting 
that the reallocation carried out by the central planners during this period was not 
effectively guided by productivity differences.  Both effects become significantly positive 
as reforms are introduced, however, and they remain so throughout the period, with the 
exception that the intersectoral effect in Russia declines in the late 1990s as the economy 
recovers.  The intersectoral effect is quite large throughout the transition in Ukraine, but 
the intrasectoral effect grows much more slowly than in Russia, converging only in the 
late 1990s.  These results, particularly concerning the intrasectoral effect, constitute 
strong evidence that economic reforms improved the efficiency of the job reallocation 
process.
34 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001) use shipments as the output measure, and they report productivity 
results per worker and per hour of work (the latter imputed for non-production workers).  These differences 
in definitions (as well as the differences in coverage of our data) should be borne in mind in the 
comparisons below. 
33 Blanchard and Kremer (1997) argue that productivity in transition economies declined due to hold-up 
problems among firms operating in thin input markets, although the magnitude of the decline may be 
somewhat overstated due to imperfect price deflation, as we noted earlier. 
34 The large intersectoral effect may reflect the importance of structural change across larger sectors, but, as 
discussed above, the magnitude of the intersectoral effect should be treated with some caution due to 
imperfect relative productivity measures and price deflators. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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How do these reallocation components relate to aggregate fluctuations?   For the 
U.S. manufacturing sector, Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001) report that the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between annual output growth and the total reallocation 
effect (equal to the sum of our intra- and intersectoral effects) is –0.31, implying 
countercyclical behavior and reflecting the “cleansing” effect of recessions (Caballero 
and Hammour, 1994).  The analogous figures in our data are 0.86 for Soviet Russia, –
0.57 for post-Soviet Russia, and 0.50 for post-Soviet Ukraine, which again imply a much 
greater degree of convergence for Russia than for Ukraine. 
  Similar conclusions can be drawn from an alternative productivity decomposition 
methodology, due to Olley and Pakes (1996).  This approach involves a cross-sectional 
decomposition of labor productivity for each industry: 
  () ( ) ∑ − − + =
e
i et i et i it P P S S P P                                                               (8)  
The first term is the unweighted average of industry productivity, and the second term, 
“cross,” shows whether activity is disproportionately located in high productivity firms 
(if the term is positive) or low productivity firms (if the term is negative).  Changes in the 
ratio of the cross term to aggregate productivity reflect the extent to which the allocation 
of activity has become more or less productivity-enhancing over time.  As explained by 
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan  (2001),  an advantage of this method compared to 
Equations (7) and (8) is that differences in productivity cross-sectionally are less affected 
by measurement error and transitory shocks.  In addition, the method permits every valid 
annual observation on a firm to be included, even if it has missing values in the previous 
year, for instance. 
The results from this exercise, taking the weighted average by employment of 
each industry’s cross-sectional decomposition, are displayed in Table 9.  The conclusions 
are similar to those from the earlier method.  The ratio of the cross term to weighted 
average firm productivity is very low during the Soviet period, suggesting that jobs tend 
to be distributed independently of productivity and that there is little tendency under this 
system for job reallocation to raise productivity.
35  After reforms begin, the ratio grows 
                                                 
35 This result can be seen most clearly in the annual calculations that lie behind the averages presented in 
Table 9:  the annual figures are remarkably stable during the Soviet period, showing little tendency for jobs William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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quite substantially in both countries, but it rises much more quickly in Russia than in 
Ukraine.  This provides further evidence that reforms may have stimulated productivity-
enhancing resource reallocation. 
The cross-sectional decomposition in Table 9 also provides further insight into the 
cyclical fluctuations of the productivity components.  While the unweighted average 
productivity declines considerably during the early reform years in both countries, the 
weighted average productivity declines by much less due to the strong tendency for labor 
to move toward more productive firms.  This effect is more than twice as strong in Russia 
than in Ukraine, implying a more effective cleansing process.  Although not shown in the 
Table, we may also note that when the expansions begin in the last two years of the data, 
moreover, the growth in the relative contribution of the cross term slows and is even 
partially reversed in the final year.  Indeed, the timing of the peak in the ratio is quite 
closely associated to the turnaround in aggregate output, which began to grow strongly in 
Russia already in 1999, while Ukraine’s growth was only modestly positive in 1999 and 
first became strong in 2000. 
In conclusion, both decomposition methods provide evidence that job flows in the 
Soviet economy were not only small in magnitude but also bore little systematic 
relationship with productivity.  During this period, moreover, the implicit cyclical 
patterns of the elements of the decomposition are just opposite to the patterns observed in 
Western data.  Beginning in the early 1990s, when liberalizing reforms were adopted, the 
situation changed rapidly and productivity growth due to job reallocation emerged in both 
countries.  Indeed, it appears that these reallocative effects work to offset productivity 
decline in the early reform period and constitute a major fraction of productivity growth 
in the late reform period.  The intrasectoral effect emerges more quickly in Russia, the 
more active reformer in the early transition.  The cyclical patterns of the elements of the 
productivity decomposition in Russia become quite similar to those in the U.S., while 
Ukraine shows less convergence, in particular in the cyclicality of the between-firm 
reallocation effect. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to move in productivity-enhancing directions.  From 1992, however the “cross” term rises strongly and 
steadily in both countries. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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6.  Determinants of Productivity-Enhancing Job Reallocation 
  The results from the productivity decompositions suggest that economic reforms 
stimulated productivity-enhancing reallocation of employment.  In order to explore the 
impact of reforms more fully, this section proposes a regression method for estimating 
the effects of private ownership and product and labor market competition, and it presents 
the results from this analysis.  The method also permits us to assess the statistical 
precision of the effects of intra- and intersectoral reallocation on productivity that we 
presented in the previous section.
36 
To motivate our method, it is useful to express the intrasectoral effect in Equation 
(7) as a covariance, namely as 
(9)                               
 
where n refers to the total number of sampled firms in all industries and the notation is 
otherwise the same as in Equation (7).  The effect may also be computed as  ˆ β  from the 
following OLS regression: 
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where  ˆ α  is an estimated intercept and  ˆeit u  is an estimated residual.  The intersectoral 
effect in Equation (6) can similarly be calculated as  ˆ γ  from 
 
(11) 
 
where  ˆ φ ,  ˆ γ , and  ˆit v  are OLS estimates of the intercept, coefficient, and residual, 
respectively,  I denotes the number of industries in the sample, and the notation is 
otherwise the same as in Equation (6). 
The usefulness of these expressions lies in the possibility to express  ˆ β  and  ˆ γ  
(and potentially  ˆ α  and  ˆ φ ) as functions of other variables, including firm characteristics, 
                                                 
36 Tybout and Westbrook (1995) and Pavcnik (2002) analyze the effects of import liberalization on 
productivity growth by comparing intrasectoral reallocation effects across industries; they find larger 
effects in traded than in nontraded goods sectors.  Our regression methods permit us to consider several 
policies simultaneously, control for other factors, distinguish policy effects at both the firm and industry 
levels, and assess the statistical significance of changes in behavior after reforms. 
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and thus to compute the impact of changes in those variables on the extent of 
productivity-enhancing job reallocation.  If we permit  ˆ β  and  ˆ γ  to vary only across the 
five country-periods in our data (also including these five dummy variables into the 
intercept), the point estimates in this analysis are the same as the averages for the 
corresponding years in Table 8.  The t-statistics associated with the coefficients in these 
estimates provide evidence that not only was the increase in productive reallocation 
greater in Russia, but also that the relationship was statistically more significant. 
Our main interest, however, concerns the effects of privatization and liberalization 
policies on productivity-enhancing reallocation within and between sectors.  Concerning 
the intrasectoral reallocation effect, we permit  ˆ β  in Equation (11) to vary with the firm-
level variables Ever Private,  Private, Product Market Dispersion, and Labor Market 
Dispersion.  Concerning the intersectoral reallocation effect, we allow  ˆ γ  in Equation (12) 
to vary with the industry means of Ever Private and Private, and the weighted averages 
of Product Market Dispersion and Labor Market Dispersion for firms operating in the 
industry.  These interaction effects are further permitted to vary by country and time 
period, so that we may assess any fluctuations over time in the relationships.  The 
inclusion of the Ever Private variable controls for the possibility of selection bias in the 
privatization process, resulting in a regression-adjusted difference-in-differences 
estimator for the effect of private ownership on the extent to which reallocation is 
productivity-enhancing.  These specifications permit an assessment of the effects of 
corporate governance and effective market competition, first, in encouraging more 
productive firms to expand relative to less productive ones within each industry and, 
second, in encouraging more productive industries to expand relative to the less 
productive ones in the economy (or manufacturing sector) as a whole.  Are privatization 
and competition associated with stronger productivity-enhancing effects of job 
reallocation? 
The results shown in Table 10 provide some evidence on this question.  Starting 
with Ever Private, the coefficient for Soviet Russia suggests that firms that would later be 
privatized have an only slightly greater tendency than those that would remain state-
owned to reallocate labor within their sector productively; thus there is little difference in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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preprivatization behavior.  After the Russian firms were privatized, however, the results 
imply that productivity growth is raised by about 1.7 percentage points (1.3 in the early 
reform period and 2.1 in the late reform period) relative to firms not yet privatized.  In 
Ukraine, by contrast, privatization is estimated to have a smaller effect in both the early 
and late reform periods.  Concerning the intersectoral effect, the proportion of industry 
employment in privatized firms has no statistically significant effect on the productivity 
of intersectoral reallocation in either country or period. 
Turning to Product Market Dispersion, we find no relationship with the 
productivity of intra- or intersectoral reallocation in Soviet Russia.  Liberalization results 
in a negative effect on the productivity of intrasectoral reallocation in the early reform 
period in each country, though the coefficient is statistically significant only in Ukraine.  
In the late reform period the effect becomes significantly positive in Russia, while 
moving only to zero in Ukraine.
37  This result is consistent with more effective pressures 
from product market competition in Russia than Ukraine.  Concerning the effects of 
intersectoral reallocation on productivity, product market dispersion appears to have had 
an immediate post-reform effect in both Russia and Ukraine.  The estimates imply that it 
remains marginally significant in late-reform Ukraine but becomes insignificant in 
Russia. 
Concerning Labor Market Dispersion, we again find for the Soviet period that 
there is no effect on the intrasectoral or intersectoral reallocation-productivity 
components.  During the transition, however, the intrasectoral effect becomes positive, 
with Ukraine again lagging Russia.  No relationship is found between labor market 
dispersion and the productivity of intersectoral reallocation. 
These results provide evidence that the extent to which job reallocation enhances 
productivity growth may indeed be a function of the economic policy and institutional 
environment.  In the Soviet period, market structure had little relationship with 
productive reallocation, while firms to be privatized looked little different (in this sense) 
from those destined to remain state-owned.  After privatization took place, there was a 
                                                 
37 As a rough approximation for gauging the coefficient magnitude, we may make the assumption that all 
firms in an industry have equal size.  In this case, a one-unit increase in Product Market Dispersion   
represents a  doubling in the number of product market competitors.  A similar approximation is useful for 
interpreting the magnitude of the coefficient on Labor Market Dispersion. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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sharp jump in the contribution of privatized firms to productivity-enhancing intrasectoral 
reallocation in Russia, but there was relatively little in Ukraine, where privatization was 
carried out much more gradually and with a stronger bias towards insider giveaways.  
Liberalizing reforms brought strong effects of product market competition and somewhat 
weaker effects of labor market competition on productivity-enhancing intrasectoral 
reallocation.  Taken together, the results may help explain why the Russian reform 
package stimulated more productive intrasectoral labor reallocation than did the 
Ukrainian in the early reform period. 
7.  Conclusion 
Previous research on job creation and destruction has revealed broadly similar 
patterns across developed market economies, including high rates of job reallocation, 
substantial persistence in annual flows, large heterogeneity among otherwise similar 
firms, and negative covariance of job flows with firm size, capital intensity, and average 
wage.  There is also evidence that job reallocation tends to be systematically related to 
productivity differences across firms.  Despite the size of the literature on these topics, 
however, economists are only beginning to study the potential effects of policies and 
institutions on job flow patterns and the extent to which they are productivity-enhancing. 
In this paper, we have exploited remarkable firm-level data to investigate some 
extreme examples of how economic policies and institutions may affect job reallocation.  
It is frequently supposed that employment determination functioned very differently 
under Soviet socialism, but there has been little prior analysis of the consequences of this 
system for job flows and their productivity consequences.   The rapid changes in 
institutions and policies in the early 1990s and the different reform programs pursued by 
Russia and Ukraine provide an opportunity to examine the consequences for job 
reallocation.  We not only compare the broad patterns of flows and their productivity 
consequences in the two countries, an undertaking that is facilitated by the identical 
coverage and variable definitions in our data as well as by the common origins of the two 
countries in the Soviet Union.  In addition, we examine micro-level differences across 
firms in ownership and in competitive pressures from product and labor markets.  Our 
approach, therefore, has not been to provide a complete description of job flow patterns William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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in these economies, a task which is beyond the scope of our data, but rather to exploit the 
quasi-experimental situation of institutional and policy change and to focus on the set of 
enterprises that experiences these changes.  For this purpose, our manufacturing census 
data for the inherited sector of medium and large-sized enterprises from 1985-2000 are 
very well-suited. 
Our analysis finds very low rates of job reallocation in Soviet Russia and a 
negligible contribution of reallocation to aggregate productivity growth.  These results 
contribute in an important way to our understanding of the poor performance of the 
Soviet system, as they support an evolutionary view of the system’s drawbacks:  while 
central planning may have functioned adequately in a static environment requiring little 
active reallocation of resources, it was much less effective in dynamic responsiveness to 
shocks requiring learning and selection – weeding out less efficient activities and 
promoting those that have become more productive.
38  That the Soviet system functioned 
very differently from market economies is underlined by our results concerning a number 
of patterns of job flows during this period, including how they vary with firm 
characteristics and with aggregate fluctuations. 
We also find that liberalizing reforms in the two largest Soviet successor states 
have brought substantial increases in job reallocation and in the productivity-enhancing 
consequences of the reallocation process.  Among the “old” manufacturing firms of both 
Russia and Ukraine, the patterns of job flows – their magnitude, heterogeneity, and 
cyclical properties – have tended to become much more similar to those documented in 
Western economies.  By contrast with Russia, however, the Ukrainian increase appears to 
have been somewhat slower, and the rise in the contribution of intrasectoral reallocation 
to productivity appears smaller.  Our examination of the effects of privatization and 
competitive pressures from product and labor markets on excess job reallocation and on 
the productivity-enhancing effect of job reallocation shows substantially stronger 
relationships for Russia than for Ukraine. 
These results have important implications for the debate over the optimal pace of 
reforms in transitional economies.  At least for the manufacturing firms in the two 
                                                 
38 Schumpeter (1942) was perhaps the first to emphasize the role of factor reallocation in capitalist growth.  
See Murrell (1992) on the evolutionary view of central planning and reform. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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countries studied in this paper, the results suggest that a more aggressive reform strategy 
produces greater job reallocation, faster job creation, and less net employment decline.  
Moreover, while much of the previous research on the transitional process has been 
preoccupied with the effects of privatization and liberalization on firm-level performance, 
this paper has shown that a potentially more important set of effects from these policies 
works through their impact on the reallocation of resources across firms.
39 
Ukraine’s transitional policies have frequently been labeled “gradualist,” 
compared to Russia’s “shock therapy,” yet the macroeconomic performance records of 
the two countries show rather similar patterns.  Aggregate output, for instance, displayed 
a similarly dismal trend for most of the 1990s, leading some observers to question the 
value of rapid privatization and liberalization.  The microeconomic evidence presented 
here, however, is consistent with the view that reforms have stimulated firm-level 
restructuring and reallocation in both countries, and that the employment reallocation has 
become productivity-enhancing.  In the early reform period, the reallocation effects 
served to reduce the magnitude of productivity decline, and more recently they have 
accounted for a major fraction of productivity growth.  These effects came about more 
quickly and strongly in Russia than in Ukraine, consistent with the hypothesis that faster 
and more effective policy reforms serve to stimulate productive reallocation. 
 
Data Appendix 
The basic sources for the firm panel data in this study are annual industrial 
registries provided by the State Committees for Statistics in Russia (the Goskomstat) and 
Ukraine (the Derzhkomstat).
40  During the Soviet period, these two statistical agencies 
were both parts of a single organization (also called the Goskomstat), and they have 
maintained essentially identical reporting procedures for the industrial registries that they 
have continued to maintain.  Thus, the data are not beset by the problems of 
comparability plaguing many cross-countries studies using micro-data.  The definitions 
of employment, output, and industrial classification (OKONKh) are identical in Russia 
and Ukraine, the same as they were in the Soviet Union.  One exception to this discussion 
concerns the definition of private ownership, an issue that arises only after reforms have 
                                                 
39 For a survey of firm-level restructuring and its determinants in transitional economies, see Djankov and 
Murrell (2002). 
40 The Russian industrial registries were also supplemented by information from registries compiled 
separately, including special registries on joint ventures, and the Ukrainian registries were supplemented by 
State Property Committee data on ownership. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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begun, and that we had to deal with by bringing in an additional data source for Ukraine.  
This procedure and the definitions of all variables are given in detail below. 
The coverage of the two countries’ registries is also quite comparable.  In Soviet 
Russia, the data include the universe of civilian industrial enterprises, while after 1991 all 
industrial firms with at least 100 employees plus all firms that are at least 25 percent 
owned by a legal entity are supposed to be included.
41  Because most industrial firms are 
large and nearly all of them were state-owned in 1992, the coverage is very high in 1992:  
the firms in the Russian registry accounted for 90.5 of officially reported total industrial 
employment, while the Ukrainian covered 94.1 percent in that year.  The coverage rate in 
relation to official employment declined somewhat thereafter, falling by the year 2000 to 
69.8 percent in Russia and 85.2 percent in Ukraine, no doubt due at least partially due to 
the entrance of new small firms owned by individuals, since the registries do not include 
such entities.  Our focus, therefore, is on the “old” sector of firms inherited from the 
Soviet Union.  All state and privatized firms are included regardless of size and 
reorganization (split-ups and spin-offs), because the nature of the privatization process 
was that legal entities (including the state) typically ended up with substantial 
shareholdings (Earle and Estrin, 1997).  Moreover, there have been few cases of genuine 
shutdowns in these countries (those bankruptcies that have taken place typically 
involving transfers of control), so our analysis includes nearly all the manufacturing 
assets inherited from the socialist system. 
Although the registries cover firms from all of the industrial sectors, we restrict 
the analysis in this paper to firms in manufacturing industries, eliminating mining and 
industrial services, in order to improve comparability with other studies.  In Russia, we 
also exclude firms classified as “public organizations,” which are non-profit firms, and 
those belonging to the ministry of culture, the environment, health, or the interior – the 
database contains a number of prison-based firms. 
To eliminate implausible outliers, we excluded observations with large 
employment changes scaled by size as follows:  firms with below 50 employees in one 
year that grow to over 250 in the next, firms with between 50 and 199 employees that 
grow over 120 percent or under –170 percent (calculated as a ratio to the average of 
current and previous year employment
42), firm with employment between 200 and 499 
growing over 100 percent or under –150 percent, and firms with employment of 500 or 
more growing over 80 percent or under –130 percent.  The labor productivity 
decompositions also exclude observations for firms in pairs of years where annual labor 
productivity growth (again scaled by the mean of the current and previous year values) 
exceeds 100 percent or is smaller than –100 percent.  The number of outliers eliminated 
according to these procedures amounted to only a trivial fraction of the original sample.
43 
Finally, the sample for the productivity analysis is reduced due to missing values 
for output, and those for the regressions on employer characteristics are reduced because 
                                                 
41 Firms subordinated to the State Committee for the Defense Industry are excluded.  See Earle and 
Komarov (2001) for some discussion of this sector. 
42 Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and most subsequent research on job flows measure employment growth 
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43 Although we consider these outliers most likely to be mistakes in the data, they are so few that including 
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of missing values in the latter set of variables.  Appendix Table 1 shows the numbers of 
observations associated with each of these sample construction procedures. 
Our data cleaning and preparation procedures paid a great deal of attention to 
longitudinal links across firms.  All of our data sources included not only an identifying 
code for the firm, but also name and address, information which we used together with 
industry, region, and size to link firms that had exited the registry with firms that had 
entered in any given year.  Because it is doubtful that there is much if any genuine exit 
and entry from the large and medium-size manufacturing sectors in these countries, the 
remaining exits and entries from the data are spurious, reflecting reorganizations such as 
split-ups and spin-offs.  In order not to count these reorganizations as employment 
changes, our analysis considers continuing firms only. 
For the purpose of comparing our results with those from other studies, we should 
emphasize some other limitations of the data.  Similar to other sources in East European 
economies, our data pertain to firms rather than establishments, although this distinction 
may be relatively unimportant in Russia and Ukraine, where most manufacturing firms 
consist of single plants.
44  Moreover, many of the larger firms provide separate reports for 
“subsidiaries” (not separate legal entities, but distinct plants).  Also like most other East 
European sources but different from typical Western data, our employment concept is an 
annual average rather than referring to a particular date or month, and it excludes “non-
industrial personnel” (chiefly, workers providing social benefits to employees).  Because 
the concept concerns a legal entity, measured employment growth includes changes 
associated with spin-offs, acquisitions, and other changes in firm boundaries, and, as 
noted above, genuine entry and exit cannot be distinguished from either reregistration or 
reporting anomalies. 
These differences from the measures typically employed in Western studies could 
create significant differences in the magnitudes of job flows, and while a recent paper by 
Brown and Earle (2002b) has recently provided evidence from survey data that the 
differences induced by these characteristics are small, they should be borne in mind in the 
comparisons with Western studies.  We provide such comparisons only as a way to 
benchmark the findings for the “old” firms in our data, the behavior of which is the focus 
of this paper. 
 
Variable Definitions and Construction 
Capital Intensityt is the rank order of firms by capital intensity in year t, calculated by 
dividing the average book value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the enterprise 
by employment.  Capital stock is adjusted for revaluations, which take place at the end of 
some years, using information on the end-of-year and beginning-of-year values.  The 
rank of capital intensity is expressed in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the most capital-
intensive. 
Employmentt is the average number of “registered industrial production personnel” 
(including both production and non-production workers, but excluding “nonindustrial 
personnel” chiefly involved in providing employee benefits) in year t.  The concept 
                                                 
44 Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 61) show that the size distributions of job flow magnitudes 
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includes the full-time equivalent number of part-time workers registered at another firm 
(“sovmestiteli”). 
Ever Privatet is a dummy = 1 if the firm is over 50 percent privately owned in the year 
2000 (or by the last year it appears in the data), 0 otherwise. 
Labor Market Dispersiont = –ln(Herfindahl-Hirschman index of employment 
concentration in the municipality in Russia and county [raion] in Ukraine) in year t, 
calculated using the industrial registries.  Our database includes firms in 3,655 
municipalities in Russia and 642 raions in Ukraine. 
Labor Productivityt = ln(Outputt/Employmentt). 
Outputt is the value of gross output produced in year t, net of VAT and excise taxes, 
expressed in constant prices in both countries.  The nominal values were deflated using 
implicit deflators calculated by dividing the growth in nominal output at the three-digit 
OKONKh (ten-sector) level by a growth in physical volume index for Russia (Ukraine).
45 
Privatet  is a dummy = 1 if the firm is over 50 percent privately owned in year t, and = 0 
otherwise  The ownership data upon which this is based for Russia are annual ownership 
codes in the registries.  For Ukraine we use annual State Property Committee data on the 
percentage of shares in private hands.  If a firm is not found in those data, we include it as 
a state firm in all years if it has a state ownership code in the 2000 registry.  Otherwise it 
is excluded from this part of the analysis, since we do not know the percentage of shares 
that are private.  Note that the nature of the registry data (described above) implies that 
Private refers to privatized, formerly state-owned entities. 
Product Market Dispersiont is the product market dispersion measure in year t.  
Dispersion indices at the regional (oblast) and national levels are obtained as –ln 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman index of product market concentration in the five-digit OKONKh 
industry) at the regional (oblast) and national level, respectively.  A weighted average of 
these is constructed using the proportion of regions with at least one enterprise in the 
five-digit industry in year t to weight the national dispersion, and one minus this 
proportion to weight the regional dispersion measure.  Russia and Ukraine use the same 
industrial classification system throughout the period.  In Russia, there are 260 five-digit 
industries represented in the data while in Ukraine there are 241.   There are 82 Russian 
and 28 Ukrainian oblasts represented in the data.  The Russian figure is smaller than the 
total of 89 regions (“subjects of the Russian Federation”) because several smaller districts 
(okrugi) are grouped together with surrounding regions, and the database does not cover 
Chechnya and Ingushetia. 
Waget is a ranking of average wage rates in year t, calculated by dividing the total wage 
bill by the average industrial employment.  Firms are ranked by average wage with the 
ranks expressed in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest average wage.  
                                                 
45 We also performed the analysis using producer price indices, although we feel these are less reliable than 
the implicit deflators.  In any event, the qualitative conclusions regarding the effects of job reallocation on 
productivity growth differed little across these two methods of deflation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Table 1 
Job Flow Rates in Russian and Ukrainian Manufacturing (%) 
 
  Russia Ukraine 
  JC   JD   JR  NC  XJR  N  JC   JD   JR  NC  XJR  N 
  Annual Job Flow Rates 
1992-93 1.63 
(0.09) 
9.35 
(0.20) 
10.98 
(0.20) 
-7.71 
(0.24) 
3.27 
(0.18)  18,500  1.04* 
(0.08) 
7.79* 
(0.22) 
8.83* 
(0.22) 
-6.76* 
(0.25) 
2.07* 
(0.17) 
6,596 
1993-94 1.16 
(0.09) 
14.49 
(0.31) 
15.65 
(0.29) 
-13.33 
(0.34) 
3.32 
(0.17)  19,788  0.95 
(0.09) 
11.45* 
(0.27) 
12.40* 
(0.28) 
-10.50* 
(0.30) 
1.89 
(0.19) 
6,768 
1994-95 2.27 
(0.13) 
11.51 
(0.26) 
13.78 
(0.28) 
-9.24 
(0.31) 
4.54 
(0.26)  20,084  1.31* 
(0.15) 
10.46 
(0.38) 
11.76* 
(0.37) 
-9.15 
(0.44) 
2.61* 
(0.30) 
7,007 
1995-96 3.29 
(0.29) 
9.59 
(0.25) 
12.87 
(0.30) 
-6.30 
(0.45) 
6.57 
(0.59)  20,127  1.73* 
(0.22) 
11.15* 
(0.38) 
12.88 
(0.36) 
-9.41* 
(0.51) 
3.47* 
(0.45) 
7,061 
1996-97 1.53 
(0.09) 
13.43 
(0.43) 
14.96 
(0.43) 
-11.90 
(0.46) 
3.07 
(0.17)  18,260  1.40 
(0.17) 
11.33* 
(0.41) 
12.72* 
(0.39) 
-9.93* 
(0.50) 
2.79 
(0.35) 
7,172 
1997-98 2.28 
(0.13) 
9.37 
(0.31) 
11.65 
(0.33) 
-7.10 
(0.33) 
4.55 
(0.26)  16,366  1.33* 
(0.09) 
9.98 
(0.39) 
11.32 
(0.38) 
-8.65* 
(0.42) 
2.67* 
(0.19) 
6,050 
1998-99 4.07 
(0.16) 
7.28 
(0.55) 
11.35 
(0.56) 
-3.21 
(0.59) 
8.14 
(0.32)  16,327  2.44* 
(0.21) 
10.06* 
(0.45) 
12.51 
(0.44) 
-7.62* 
(0.55) 
4.89* 
(0.41) 
7,863 
1999-00 6.07 
(0.19) 
4.66 
(0.20) 
10.73 
(0.29) 
1.41 
(0.26) 
9.33 
(0.39)  16,088  3.43* 
(0.22) 
8.55* 
(0.41) 
11.99* 
(0.38) 
-5.12* 
(0.53) 
6.87* 
(0.44) 
6,510 
  Average Annual Job Flow Rates, By Period 
Soviet 
  (1985-1992) 
0.87 
(0.23) 
3.94 
(0.62) 
4.81 
(0.76) 
-3.06 
(0.55) 
1.75 
(0.45)  108,545  N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.  N.A. 
Early Reform 
  (1992-1996) 
2.09 
(0.10) 
11.23 
(0.20) 
13.32 
(0.20) 
-9.15 
(0.25) 
4.17 
(0.20)  78,485  1.26* 
(0.08) 
10.21* 
(0.23) 
11.47* 
(0.22) 
-8.96 
(0.27) 
2.51* 
(0.17)  27,432 
Late Reform 
  (1996-2000) 
3.49 
(0.09) 
8.69 
(0.26) 
12.17 
(0.29) 
-5.20 
(0.27) 
6.98 
(0.18)  67,040  2.15* 
(0.12) 
9.98* 
(0.30) 
12.13 
(0.28) 
-7.83* 
(0.37) 
4.30* 
(0.24)  27,595 
Notes:  JC = job creation; JD = job destruction; JR = job reallocation; NC = net employment growth; XJR = excess job reallocation; all of these are calculated as rates with 
respect to average employment across the two adjacent years.  N = sample size (number of firm-year observations).  Standard errors in parentheses.  The star (*) signifies that 
the Ukrainian rate is statistically significantly different from the Russian rate at the one percent level.  “N.A.” indicates not available. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Table 2 
Average Annual Job Flow Persistence Rates (%) 
 
 Creation  Persistence Destruction  Persistence 
  1-Year 2-Year 1-Year 2-Year 
Soviet 
Russia  69.9 55.0 92.8 91.4 
Reform 
Russia  58.5 34.2 89.4 81.5 
Reform 
Ukraine  59.1 36.4 92.6*  87.3* 
Notes:  The Soviet 1-year and 2-year persistence rates are calculated 
for creation and destruction occurring between 1985-92.  The reform 
period 1-year persistence is calculated for job flows between 1992-99 
and the 2-year persistence is for 1992-98. The star (*) signifies that 
the Reform Ukraine rate is statistically significantly different from 
the Reform Russia rate at the one percent level. 
 
 
Table 3 
Distribution of Annual Employment Growth Rates (%) 
 
  5%  10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%  Mean  Std  Dev 
Soviet Russia  -20.2  -12.9  -5.8  -1.4  1.2  7.3  14.9  -1.9  15.9 
Early Reform Russia  -43.8  -32.3  -18.3  -7.2  0.6  10.3  21.1  -8.8  24.3 
Early Reform Ukraine  -32.9*  -24.7*  -14.7*  -6.4*  0.0*  5.4*  10.3*  -8.2*  16.4 
Late Reform Russia  -54.5  -33.7  -15.4  -3.6  3.8  14.3  25.4  -7.4  28.8 
Late Reform Ukraine  -46.5*  -31.0*  -16.2* -6.7*  0.2*  9.2*  19.2* -9.2*  24.7 
Notes:  The star (*) signifies that the Ukrainian rate is statistically significantly different from the Russian rate at the one percent 
level.  For the percentiles, these tests come from quantile regressions using bootstrapped standard errors with 100 repetitions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Table 4 
Average Annual Job Flow Rates by Sector (%), 1992-2000 
 
  Russia Ukraine 
  JC JD JC JD 
All Manufacturing  2.79  9.96  1.70*  10.10 
Fuel 4.36  4.99  3.12  2.63 
Ferrous Metallurgy  3.70  5.70  2.83  3.25* 
Non-Ferrous Metallurgy  4.32  7.13  3.93  6.06 
Chemicals 2.72  6.77  1.39*  9.08* 
Machine-Building 1.75  11.59  1.01*  12.63 
Pulp and Paper  4.01  10.61  1.65*  11.49 
Construction Materials  2.92  8.82  1.38*  10.06* 
Light   2.19  14.50  1.47*  12.49* 
Food Processing  4.85  7.44  3.08*  6.88 
Note:  The star (*) signifies that the Ukrainian rate is statistically significantly different 
from the Russian rate at the one percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Percentage of Excess Job Flows Between Five-Digit Industries 
 
 Russia  Ukraine 
Soviet   13.0  N.A. 
Early Reform   18.6  16.5 
Late Reform   14.3  13.9 
Note:  These figures reflect average annual calculations of the decomposition of XJR 
into between- and within-industry components for each of the five country-periods. 
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Table 6 
Firm Characteristics 
 
  Soviet Russia  Early Reform Russia Early Reform Ukraine  Late Reform Russia  Late Reform Ukraine
  Mean  SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Ever Private  0.828 --  0.816  0.515  0.814  0.530  
Private  0.000 --  0.489  0.117  0.798  0.468  
Product Market 
Dispersion 
2.121  0.697 1.941 0.682 1.678 0.768 1.728 0.656 1.457 0.715 
Labor Market 
Dispersion 
1.867  1.284 1.979 1.334 1.892 0.732 1.825 1.219 2.001 0.790 
Employment  782  2586 685 2229 548 1431 530 1856 395 1162 
Note:  “SD” refers to standard deviation, shown only for the continuous variables.  Employment is not logged in the table, but it 
is in the regression analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Effects of Firm Characteristics on Excess Job Reallocation (%) 
 
 Soviet 
Russia 
Early Reform 
Russia 
Early Reform 
Ukraine 
Late Reform 
Russia 
Late Reform 
Ukraine 
Ever Private  0.27 -0.59  -1.92  0.53 -2.75 
Private  ---   1.12  -0.18  1.15  1.22 
Product Market Dispersion  -0.37 0.39  0.05  0.33 0.06 
Labor Market Dispersion  0.21 0.53  0.17  0.17 -0.07 
Capital Intensity  -0.38 0.58 -0.32  0.00 -0.56 
Wage  -0.06 2.29  0.70  1.44 2.04 
Employment  -0.26 -0.59  -0.48  -1.50 -1.10 
Note:  These coefficients are calculated on the basis of Equation (5) in the text. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 514 
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Table 8 
 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth 
  Total Growth  Within Firm  Intra- 
Sector 
Intra-Sector 
Cov 
Inter- 
Sector 
Inter-Sector 
Within Cov 
Inter-Sector 
Between Cov 
Inter-Sector 
Cov Cov 
Soviet  Russia  0.0055  0.0004 0.0020  -0.0009 0.0035 0.0006  -0.0000 0.0000 
Early Reform Russia  -0.1193  -0.1710  0.0265  -0.0035  0.0271  0.0016  -0.0002  0.0002 
Early Reform Ukraine  -0.1776  -0.2428  0.0136  -0.0009  0.0474  0.0057  -0.0000  -0.0003 
Late Reform Russia  0.0634  0.0360  0.0256  -0.0063  0.0077  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
Late  Reform  Ukraine  0.0666  0.0030 0.0275  0.0004 0.0349 0.0013  -0.0003  -0.0001 
Note:  Using equations (6) and (7) in the text, total growth is  t P ∆ , the within-firm effect is ∑ ∑ − − ∆
ie
eit eit it S P S 1 1 , the intrasectoral effect is 
( ) ∑∑ − − − − − ∆
ie
it eit eit it P P S S 1 1 1 1 , the intrasectoral covariance is ∑ ∑ ∆ ∆ − −
ie
eit eit it S P S 1 1 , the intersectoral effect is  ( ) ∑ − − − ∆
i
t it it P P S 1 1 , the intersectoral within covariance is 
∑∑ ∆ ∆
ie
eit eit it S P S , the intersectoral between covariance is  ( ) ∑ ∑ − − − ∆ ∆
ie
it eit eit it P P S S 1 1 , and the intersectoral covariance covariance is 
∑∑∆ ∆ ∆
ie
eit eit it S P S . 
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Table 9 
Cross-Sectional Decomposition of Labor Productivity 
 
 Weighted 
Average 
Productivity 
Unweighted 
Average 
Productivity 
Cross 
Cross/Weighted 
Average 
Productivity 
Soviet Russia  2.790  2.756  0.035  0.012 
Early Reform Russia  2.339  2.117  0.223  0.096 
Early Reform Ukraine  5.912  5.734  0.179  0.030 
Late Reform Russia  2.419  2.037  0.381  0.158 
Late Reform Ukraine  5.604  5.274  0.330  0.059 
Note:  As in Equation (8) in the text, weighted average productivity is ∑
i
it itP S , unweighted 
average productivity is  it
i
itP S ∑ , and cross is  ( )( ) ∑ ∑ − −
ie
it eit it eit it P P S S S . 
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Table 10 
The Effects of Private Ownership and Market Competition on Productivity-
Enhancing Job Reallocation:  Within- and Across-Industry Regressions 
  Intrasectoral Effect  Intersectoral Effect  
PD*SovietRussia  0.002     (1.29)  -0.005   (-0.99) 
PD*EarlyReformRussia  0.018     (2.53)  0.021    (1.19) 
PD*EarlyReformUkraine  0.018     (3.84)  -0.000   (-0.02) 
PD*LateReformRussia  0.005     (1.15)  0.000    (0.02) 
PD*LateReformUkraine  0.014     (1.67)  0.014    (1.04) 
PD*EverPrivate*SovietRussia  0.003     (2.92)  -0.003   (-0.78) 
PD*EverPrivate*EarlyReformRussia  0.009     (2.45)  -0.006   (-0.20) 
PD*EverPrivate*EarlyReformUkraine -0.003    (-1.36)  -0.063   (-2.30) 
PD*EverPrivate*LateReformRussia  -0.010    (-2.39)  0.023    (0.77) 
PD*EverPrivate*LateReformUkraine  -0.006    (-1.03)  -0.058   (-1.02) 
PD*Private*EarlyReformRussia  0.013     (3.32)    0.002    (0.35) 
PD*Private*EarlyReformUkraine  0.005     (1.86)  0.016    (0.94) 
PD*Private*LateReformRussia  0.021     (5.46)  -0.031   (-1.01) 
PD*Private*LateReformUkraine  0.010     (1.88)  0.021    (0.59) 
PD*ProdDisp.*SovietRussia  -0.001    (-0.73)  0.003    (1.71) 
PD*ProdDisp.*EarlyReformRussia  -0.004    (-1.15)  0.016    (2.61) 
PD*ProdDisp.*EarlyReformUkraine  -0.003    (-2.84)  0.074    (3.71) 
PD*ProdDisp.*LateReformRussia  0.007     (3.22)  0.005    (1.10) 
PD*ProdDisp.*LateReformUkraine  -0.000    (-0.12)  0.065    (1.65) 
PD*LaborDisp.*SovietRussia  0.001     (1.47)  0.003    (1.57) 
PD*LaborDisp.*EarlyReformRussia  0.005     (3.68)  -0.007   (-1.21) 
PD*LaborDisp.*EarlyReformUkraine  0.000     (0.17)  0.006    (0.51) 
PD*LaborDisp.*LateReformRussia  0.003     (2.46)  0.004    (1.08) 
PD*LaborDisp.*LateReformUkraine  0.005     (2.01)  -0.006   (-1.13) 
Adjusted R
2  0.009 0.143 
N 216,868  5,432 
Notes:  These are OLS regressions with t statistics, adjusted for firm clustering, reported 
in parentheses.  The specifications also include five period-country effects, main effects 
for all the variables, and all two-way interactions.  In the first column of results (based on 
Equation (10) in the text with β permitted to vary by country, time period, ownership and 
market structure), PD is the lagged deviation of the firm’s productivity from the industry 
average ( 1 1 − − − it eit P P ) divided by nit-1*Var( 1 1 − − − it eit P P ), where nit-1  is the number of firms 
in industry i in year t-1.  In the second column (based on Equation (11) of the text with γ 
varying by country, period, and average industrial ownership and market structure), PD 
represents the analogous lagged difference in productivity between the industry and the 
average for all manufacturing ( 1 1 − − − t it P P ), scaled by the number of industries times the 
variance of this difference.     Early and late reform refer to 1993-96, and 1997-2000, 
respectively, while Soviet Russia refers to 1986-1992.  Variable definitions are given 
briefly in the text and in detail in the Data Appendix. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Construction of the Samples:  Numbers of Firm-Year Observations 
 
 Soviet 
Russia 
Early Reform 
Russia 
Early Reform 
Ukraine 
Late Reform 
Russia 
Late Reform 
Ukraine 
Total sample  141,371  113,216 33,463 92,730 33,716 
–  non-manufacturing  105,344 82,854 27,709 71,216 28,631 
– “public organizations”  104,217  80,099  No Info.  69,001  No Info. 
– employment outliers = Sample 1  103,920 79,916 27,668 68,481 28,490 
– missing firm characteristics = Sample 2  73,743 61,201 26,782 40,109 26,075 
   – firms with missing output   100,860 74,199 27,385 64,291 27,116 
– productivity outliers = Sample 3  99,542 68,876 25,708 56,620 22,599 
– missing firm characteristics = Sample 4  74,005 58,575 24,589 41,713 17,986 
Note:  The total sample includes all observations on employment growth.  As described in the text, firms engaged primarily in non-manufacturing activities, 
those classified as “public organizations,” and a small number with absurdly large employment changes were deleted, yielding the sample studied for 
measurement of job flows, Sample 1.  Those missing information on firm characteristics (average wage, capital intensity, ownership, product and labor 
market concentration) are excluded from Sample 2, used for the job flows – employer characteristics regressions.  Firms with missing information on output 
and with unbelievably large changes in labor productivity are excluded from Sample 3 for the productivity analysis, and those missing ownership or product 
and labor market concentration are excluded from Sample 4, used for the firm-level job-reallocation-productivity regression. 
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